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LEGISLATIVE NOTE
AN OVERVIEW OF CHANGES IN FEDERAL
TRADEMARK AND COPYRIGHT LAWS:
The Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988 and
The Berne Implementation Act of 1988.
I. INTRODUCTION
The past year has been filled with much legislative activism in
the area of intellectual property law. One of the apparent goals of
Congress was to bring the United States into alignment with the
Berne Convention of Literary and Artistic Works, commonly re-
ferred to as the Berne Convention.1 In pursuit of membership to
the Berne Convention, Congress was required to make concessions
in the existing U.S. intellectual property laws, most significantly in
trademark and copyright formalities.
The following is a brief survey of two important Acts passed
and signed into effect in 1988: The Trademark Law Revision Act;
and The Berne Convention Implementation Act. This overview is
intended to flag the practitioner to key changes in Trademark and
Copyright laws, but should not replace an actual reading of the re-
vised statutes.
II. TRADEMARK LAW REVISION ACT oF 1988
On November 16, 1988, President Reagan signed into effect the
Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988.2 The effective date of the
Act is "one year after the date of enactment of this Act,"3 that is
November 16, 1989. Significant changes are made in the Act which
affect the basic traditional approach to trademark registration in the
United States. It is important that attorneys and their clients are
aware of these changes, as it may affect business planning and
strategy.
1. A discussion of the rights associated with the Berne Convention, and the countries
currently members of the Convention is beyond the scope of this overview. It is worth men-
tioning, however, that of the major economic powers, the United States, Soviet Union and
China are not members of the Convention.
2. Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-667, 102 Stat 3935 (amend-
ing 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1128 (1988)).
3. Pub. L. No. 100-667, § 136, 102 Stat. 3935, 3935.
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The following presents a discussion of the key changes to the
Trademark Act of 1946 which are effected by the Trademark Law
Revision Act of 1988 (hereinafter "Revision Act"). The discussion
is divided into four categories: (1) prospective use registration; (2)
changes in duration; (3) "commercial defamation"; and, (4) miscel-
laneous provisions. These reflect the three major changes made by
the Revision Act, with brief comments regarding other minor
changes.
Absent from this discussion is an analysis of the Satellite Home
Viewer Act of 1988,4 establishing a new Section 119 in the Copy-
right Act to create a temporary compulsory license for satellite car-
rier retransmissions to the public for private home viewing. The bill
was attached to the Trademark Law Revision Act as a concession
in negotiation sessions between members of the Senate.'
A. Prospective Use Registration Under Section I(B)
15 U.S.C. section 1051 is amended by the Revision Act by ad-
dition of the following language:
(b) A person who has a bona fide intention, under circum-
stances showing the good faith of such person, to use a trade-
mark in commerce may apply to register the trademark under
this Act on the principal register hereby established... 6
This language explicitly allows application for registration of a
mark prior to actual use of the mark on goods in commerce, as re-
quired by the existing Trademark Act.7
1. Legislative History
The legislative intent behind allowing prospective use registra-
tion for trademarks was stated by Congressman Moorhead in the
Congressional Record for October 19, 1988:
It balances their [American businesses] need for greater certainty
in the marketplace with significant safeguards against abuse. It is
consistent with our obligations under the Paris Convention, and
at the same time, it eliminates the advantage foreign companies
enjoy in applying for U.S. trademark rights. It also replaces the
commercial "sham" of token use with a reasonable, workable al-
ternative that preserves the integrity of U.S. trademark law.3
4. Pub. L. No. 100-667, 102 Stat. 3949 (1988).
5. 36 Pat. Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) 741 (Oct. 27, 1988).
6. Pub. L. No. 100-667, § 103(9), 102 Stat. at 3935-36.
7. See 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (1988).
8. 36 Pat. Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) 761 (Oct. 27, 1988).
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At present, businesses must actually use a trademark in commerce
prior to obtaining any protection or rights under the law. Uncer-
tainty under this system is created by the fact that expenditures
must be made in advertising costs prior to obtaining any rights.
Thus, if conflicts arise during the registration process, absent a mu-
tually agreeable resolution of continued use by both contestants,
one party will sustain a loss due to prerequisite advertising ex-
penses. The revisions enacted by the 1989 Act mitigate these ex-
penses associated with trademark rights.
2. Changes in the Application Process
An application for trademark registration under the Revision
Act remains substantially the same as under the existing Act. The
main change in the application process is found in the replacement
of a statement of actual use of the mark in commerce with a state-
ment of bona fide intention to use the mark in commerce.9
The Senate Report states that although a statement of intent to
use a mark may be sufficient for application purposes under new
Section l(b), "[b]ona fide intent is measured by objective factors." 10
The main "objective factors" expressed in the Senate Report in-
clude: (1) the number of intent-to-use applications filed per new
product;11 (2) intent-to-use applications on obviously unregisterable
marks (e.g. merely descriptive marks); and (3) an excessive number
of intent-to-use applications filed but not used. 2 ' The Senate ex-
pressly recognized multiple filings to cover the same goods, so long
as pending intent-to-use applications are withdrawn once a mark is
actually used.13
Revision Act applications under Section l(b) undergo exami-
nation for legal sufficiency in the same manner as a Section l(a)
application based upon actual use, and a Notice of Allowance is
issued for Section l(b) applications. 14 In addition, the Senate Re-
port makes it clear that once an application is filed, the goods iden-
tified in the application may only be narrowed.5 An applicant must
9. Pub. L. No. 100-667, § 103(9), 102 Stat. at 3936.
10. S. REP. No. 515, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 23, reprinted in 1988 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 5577, 5586.
11. Since actual use is not required until six months after filing an intent-to-use trade-
mark application, it is conceivable that an applicant may have a bona fide intention to use
more than one mark on one product. The fact that an applicant cannot decide at the time of
application which mark will be used, does not negate a bona fide intention to use the mark.
12. Id. at 24.
13. Id., 4988 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5577, 5587.
14. Pub. L. No. 100-667, § 103(9), 102 Stat. at 3936.
15. S. REP. No. 515 at 24, U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 5586.
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file a verified statement of actual use within six months after the
date on which the notice of allowance with respect to the Section
l(b) application is issued.16 An automatic six-month extension of
time is granted upon written request of an applicant fied within the
initial six-month period.17 Further extensions of time, not aggregat-
ing more than 24 months, are available upon a showing of good
cause." Thus, the longest possible time for filing a verified state-
ment of actual use for a mark is 36 months from the time a Notice
of Allowance issues on the Section 1(b) application.
If a verified statement of use is not filed within one year from
the date of filing a Section l(b) application, applicant's are required
to show good cause, plus a continued bona fide intention to use the
mark.'9 Absent this showing, the application is considered
abandoned.2"
Examination of Section l(b) applications may significantly add
to the work of Trademark Examiners. For example, a Section 1(b)
application is filed based on prospective use of a trademark. If the
applicant decides to abandon the mark prior to the six-month time
period, an Examiner may have wasted valuable time examining a
moot application.
. Registration on the Supplemental Register still requires actual
use in commerce by the owner.2 The existing Act requires actual
use of the mark "upon or in connection with any goods or services
for the year preceding the filing of the application" for supplemental
registration.22 Since the Supplemental Register is reserved for
marks capable of functioning as a trademark for an applicant's
goods or services, but fails to satisfy the requirements of the Princi-
pal Register,23 retention of the actual use requirement for supple-
mental registration is consistent with the prospective use provisions.
3. The Effect of Filing Under Section l(b)
Filing a trademark application under Section l(b) constitutes
constructive use of the mark, and grants a nationwide right of prior-
16. Pub. L. No. 100-667, § 103(9), 102 Stat. at 3936.
17. Id., 102 Stat. at 3937.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Pub. L. No. 100-667, § 103, 102 Stat. at 3937.
21. Pub. L. No. 100-667, § 121, 102 Stat. at 3942. See also S. REP. No. 515 at 37, U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws at 5599 ("The Act's provisions relating to intent-to-use and
constructive use do not extend to supplemental register applications or registrations.").
22. 15 U.S.C. § 1091 (1988).
23. Id.
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ity.2 4 The right of priority is not effective against any other person
who has not abandoned the same mark and has previously either:
(1) used the mark; (2) filed an application to register the mark
which was not abandoned; or, (3) filed a foreign application which
has not been abandoned. 2' This language makes it clear that the
U.S. is using a first-to-file system of trademark registration. It also
assures an applicant's rights as against other prospective U.S. users,
but not as against prospective foreign users.
Another important aspect of the Revision Act is the prohibi-
tion against assignment of Section 1(b) applications prior to filing
the verified statement of use, except under narrowly defined condi-
tions. 26 The Senate Report states that the prohibition "is consistent
with the principle that a mark may be validly assigned only with the
business or goodwill attached to the use of the mark and will dis-
courage trafficking in marks."'27 If prospective rights to a mark are
being recognized by the Revision Act, the legislature is taking it
away by this language. Thus, if a business is sold while a Section
l(b) application is pending, prospective rights cannot be included as
part of the business. The application must either go abandoned by
the original applicant and refied by the business purchaser, or sepa-
rate provisions must be included in the purchase contract for the
continued prosecution and post-prosecution transfer of rights to the
mark.
If the parties have "improperly evaded the prohibition on as-
signments," the certificate of registration may be voided.28Although
statutory provisions for voiding such registrations was not included
in the final version of the Revision Act, it may be wise to use and
fie a statement of use prior to entering into any assignment for a
mark.
The perception of foreign companies having an edge on U.S.
companies by virtue of prospective use filing in other countries is
perpetuated by Mr. Moorhead's statement.29 Foreign countries,
such as Japan, which do not require actual use of marks in com-
merce prior to registration, can apply for registration of popular
U.S. marks, such as Coca-Cola, in their home country. This effec-
tively precludes U.S. companies from using their mark on an inter-
national basis without obtaining licenses for use of their own name
24. Pub. L. No. 100-667, § 109(3), 102 Stat. at 3939.
25. Id.
26. Pub. L. No. 100-667, § 112(1), 102 Stat. at 3939.
27. S. REP. No. 515 at 31, U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws at 5593-94.
28. 36 Pat. Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) 759 (Oct. 27, 1988).
29. See supra note 8.
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abroad. By joining the countries which allow prospective use trade-
mark filings, U.S. companies not only have a means by which they
can assure that a mark is not used abroad prior to their own entry
into the marketplace, but also have a retaliatory tool against foreign
companies. Shrewd trademark counsel will insist on filing for con-
current international trademark registration for their clients.
While the actual use requirement for trademark protection
under the existing U.S. laws has led to the practice of "sham" com-
mercial use of marks for purposes of registration, a move from ac-
tual use to bona fide intent to use merely seems to replace one
"sham" for another. There are no express sanction provisions for
registration without actual use, however, safeguards for abuse are
found in the Revision Act. Although proposals to include a defini-
tion of "bona fide" restrictions on the number of contemporaneous
applications were rejected, the Senate looked to other means for de-
terring abuse of the intent-to-use system.30 Two such deterrence
means include a prohibition against assignments of intent-to-use ap-
plications, and a provision for cancellation of registrations based on
fraud, with an award of damages "to anyone who is damaged by a
fraudulent registration."3
B. Duration of Registration
The term of trademark registration has been reduced by fifty
percent - from twenty years under the 1976 Act, to ten years
under the Revision Act. 2 A Section 8 affidavit is still required
prior to the expiration of the sixth year of registration. 33 The affida-
vit must recite the goods or services to which the mark is applied in
commerce, along with the additional requirement that a specimen
or facsimile showing current use of the mark accompany the affida-
vit.34 The requirement under the Revision Act is more stringent
than under the 1976 Act in that a Section 8 affidavit will require
that the owner state which goods or services originally recited in the
registration continue to bear the registered mark.35 Previously, an
owner merely needed to show "that said mark is still in use."'36
Registration may be renewed for ten year periods of time.37
30. S. REP. No. 515 at 24, U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 5586.
31. S. REP. No. 515 at 25, U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 5587.
32. Pub. L. No. 100-667, § 110(1), 102 Stat. at 3939.
33. See 15 U.S.C. § 1058 (1988).
34. Id.
35. Pub. L. No. 100-667, § 110(2), 102 Stat. at 3939.
36. See 15 U.S.C. § 1058(a) (1988).
37. Pub. L. No. 100-667, § 132, 102 Stat. at 3939.
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The legislative intent behind the shortened registration term is
stated by Congressman Kastenmeier during the House meeting, to
"free up otherwise unavailable marks."3 More clearly stated by
Mr. Moorhead at the same hearing, the reduction of term of regis-
tration from twenty to ten years is to "eliminate 'deadwood' trade-
marks from the register"39 by increasing the burden, primarily
financial, upon the trademark owner.
Mr. Moorhead commented that "[the renewal requirement] in-
creases the requirements trademark owners must meet in order to
maintain their rights and it strengthens the Lanham Act's definition
of use in commerce."'  While there are few who would dispute the
first part of Mr. Moorhead's statement, the latter part is less com-
prehensible. Requiring a trademark owner to pay fees twice as
often under the Revision Act as under the 1976 Act does not dimin-
ish the use of a trademark, but merely the willingness to maintain
registration. Trademark owners must now not only be diligent, but
wealthy.
C. Commercial Defamation
In addition to a cause of action for false designation of origin of
goods or services, a second cause of action is added to 15 U.S.C.
section 1125 under the Revision Act for misrepresentation of an-
other's goods:
(a) Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or
services.. .uses in commerce any.. .false or misleading descrip-
tion of fact, or false or misleading representation of fact, which
(2) in commercial advertising or promotion, misrepresents
the nature, characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin of
his or her or another person's goods, services, or commer-
cial activities, shall be liable in a civil action by any person
who believes that he or she is or is likely to be damaged by
such act.41
Two major issues are worth noting at this point: (1) standing ap-
pears to be given to consumers, as well as to trademark owners;
and, (2) the cause of action is limited to commercial activities. Each
will be discussed further below.
38. 36 Pat. Trademark & Copyright J. (J3NA) 759 (Oct. 27, 1988).
39. Id. at 762.
40. Id.
41. Pub. L. No. 100-667, § 132, 102 Stat. at 3946.
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1. Standing
The use of the broad term "any person" indicates that the
causes of action for both false designation of goods and misrepre-
sentation of fact grant standing to consumers in addition to trade-
mark owners. However, a provision expressly granting consumers
standing was eliminated from the bill.4 2 Applying principles of stat-
utory analysis, such a deliberate omission of this language would
seem to imply that consumers were not intended to have standing
under the Revision Act. However, the legislative history carefully
refutes this assumption.
In the comment to the Revision Act it is stated, "The plain
meaning of the statute already includes consumers, since it grants
any 'person' the right to sue."43 Mr. Kastenmeier's statements con-
firm this reading:
I continue to believe that consumers already have standing to sue
under current law, and that the provision that was deleted [ex-
pressly granting standing to consumers] only clarified that law.44
The Senate Report contains language that the amendment codifies
the "interpretation [Section 1125(a)] has been given by the
courts. ' 45 Thus, it may be concluded that consumers have the same
standing to sue under 15 U.S.C. section 1125 under the Revision
Act as they did under the 1976 Act.
2. Limitation to Commercial Speech
The language added to 15 U.S.C. section 1125 is carefully and
expressly limited to false and misleading statements of fact in com-
mercial speech. The comments accompanying the Revision Act are
instructive as to this limitation.
The drafters of the Revision Act foresaw legitimate constitu-
tional issues arising from the creation of a cause of action in com-
mercial defamation. The need to narrowly construe the action to
commercial speech follows in light of the first amendment cases of
Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission
of New York,46 Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citi-
zens Consumers Council,4 7 and Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc 48 as well
42. 36 Pat. Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) 760 (Oct. 27, 1988).
43. Id.
44. Id. at 759.
45. S. REP. No. 515 at 40, U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 5603.
46. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
47. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
48. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
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as New York Times v. Sullivan.49 Following Gertz, the drafters lim-
ited the misstatements under this section to misstatements of fact.
Political advertising and promotion is specifically not covered by
this Revision Act.
As a final point of clarification, the comment states:
Nor should it be read to change the standards in current law
with respect to comparative advertising, which assists consumers
in choosing among various competing products. The section is
narrowly drafted to encompass only clearly false and misleading
commercial speech.50
Clearly, the legislature does not want to see the Trademark Act, or
any part of it, struck down on Constitutional grounds.
15 U.S.C. section 114(2) explicitly protects "innocent" dissem-
inators of offending materials, for example, newspapers, magazines,
broadcasters, and other media, including electronic media from
civil liability under 15 U.S.C. section 1125(a).5 1 These exempted
classes are consistent with first amendment rights under the Consti-
tution, in assuring no restrictions on political speech or dissemina-
tion of information concerning products.
D. Miscellaneous Provisions
The following minor amendments to the 1976 Act are placed
in effect by the Revision Act:
1. There will no longer be a separate register for service
marks.5 2 This does not, however, mean that service marks will not
be registrable, only that they will be included on the Principle and
Supplemental Registers.
2. In the same manner as with service marks, there will no
longer be a separate register for collective and certification marks.
5 3
3. If a registered mark becomes generic as to some, but not
all, goods or services for which it is registered, a petition to cancel
the registration for only those goods or services may be filed.54
Under this section, an entire mark is not removed from registration,
but trademark rights remain only in those goods for which the
mark has not become generic.
4. In certain administrative proceedings, final judgments in
49. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
50. 36 Pat. Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) 760 (Oct. 27, 1988).
51. Pub. L. No. 100-667, § 127, 102 Stat. at 3943.
52. Pub. L. No. 100-667, § 105(2), 102 Stat. at 3938.
53. Pub. L. No. 100-667, § 106(2), 102 Stat. at 3938.
54. Pub. L. No. 100-667, § 115(4), 102 Stat. at 3040.
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proceedings involving Section l(b) applications may be suspended
pending actual use of a mark and registration of a trademark."
E. Conclusion
As a whole, the Revision Act brings the United States trade-
mark registration system in line with most other developed coun-
tries. By going to a first-to-file system, the trademark attorney is
put under more pressure to process federal trademark applications
through the office. Due diligence by the attorney, as well as rapid
public education regarding rights in trademarks, is necessary to as-
sure that the effects of the Revision Act do not result in further
handicapping U.S. businesses.
Reduction of the trademark term increases the workload on
trademark attorneys, and generates substantial additional income
for the Patent and Trademark Office. Whether this shortened dura-
tion will, in fact, reduce the confusion over competing marks is un-
certain. Trademarks should not become a commodity that only
large businesses can afford. Efforts to clean out the Trademark Of-
fice register should maintain the rights of small businesses and indi-
viduals who are entitled to the same protection of their goodwill
and fruits of their labor as major businesses.
III. THE BERNE CONVENTION IMPLEMENTATION ACT OF 1988
On October 31, 1988, President Reagan signed into law the
Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988 (hereinafter the
Berne Act)56 effective March 1, 1989. The most significant modifi-
cations to the existing Copyright Act are to the notice and registra-
tion requirements. These two major changes will be discussed, as
well as other minor revisions to the Copyright Act, below.
The Berne Act was implemented in order to bring U.S. copy-
right law in line with the Berne Convention, an international agree-
ment which set uniform requirements for copyright protection
among many industrialized nations.57 By implementing the Berne
Act, the U.S. is now a member of the Berne Convention. Becoming
a member of the Convention was considered an important step in
increasing trade among member nations and assuring U.S. partici-
55. Pub. L. No. 100-667, § 118(3), 102 Stat. at 3940; See also Pub. L. No. 100-667,
§ 120(2), 102 Stat. at 3942.
56. Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat.
2857 (1988) (amending 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (1988)).
57. A. LATMAN, R. GORMAN & J. GINSBURG, COPYRIGHT FOR THE EIGHTIES, 298
(1985).
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pation in formulating international copyright policy.58
A. Notice Requirements of Sections 401 and 402
The two major changes in the notice requirements are (1) lift-
ing the mandatory notice requirements on individual copies and
phonorecords of copyrighted works; and (2) strengthening the evi-
dentiary weight of such a notice if a copyright owner chooses to
provide one.
17 U.S.C. section 401 sets forth the notice requirements for
visually perceptible copies. Prior to the Berne Act, Section 401(a)
read:
Whenever a work protected under this title is published in the
United States or elsewhere by authority of the copyright owner, a
notice of copyright as provided by this section shall be placed on
publicly distributed copies from which the work can be visually
perceived, either directly or with the aid of a machine or
device.59
The Berne Act replaced the mandatory language "shall" in
Section 401(a) with the permissive language "may. '  Thus, a
copyright owner who publishes a work protected under Title 17 is
no longer required to place a notice on each copy of the work pub-
licly distributed after March 1, 1989. However, a prudent copy-
right owner may choose to place a notice on each copy'of the work
despite the amendment. As discussed below, providing the optional
notice may afford an owner the maximum copyright protection
under Title 17.
Section 401(b) addresses the form of the notice on the copies,
and has also been modified by the Berne Act. Section 401(b) now
reads, in part, "If a notice appears on the copies it shall consist of
the following. . ." (emphasis added).61
Modifications of Section 401 also apply to the provisions of
Section 402 which set forth the notice requirements for pho-
norecords and sound recordings. As in Section 401, the general
provisions of Section 402(a) have been modified to replace the word
"shall" with the word "may;" and the form of notice provisions of
Section 402(b) have been modified to state, "If a notice
58. See S. REP. No. 352, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 23, reprinted in 1988 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEWS 3706, 3707.
59. 17 U.S.C. § 401(a) (1987) (emphasis added).
60. Pub. L. No. 100-568, § 7(a)(1), 102 Stat. at 2857.
61. Pub. L. No. 100-568, § 7(a)(3), 102 Stat. at 2857.
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2262appears....
1. Evidentiary Weight of Notice
To encourage copyright owners to provide notices on their
copies, the Berne Act added Section 401(d), which states:
Evidentiary Weight of Notice.- If a notice of copyright in the
form and position specified by this section appears on the pub-
lished copy or copies to which a defendant in a copyright in-
fringement suit had access, then no weight shall be given to such
a defendant's interposition of a defense based on innocent in-
fringement in mitigation of actual or statutory damages, except
as provided in the last sentence of section 504(c)(2).63
Thus, under Section 401(d) a copyright owner who places a notice
on publicly distributed copies has the added benefit of precluding
any potential infringer from defending on grounds of innocent in-
fringement. Consequently, the mere existence of a notice precludes
any possibility of innocent infringement as a means of reducing a
damage award.
The presumption against innocent infringement in notice situa-
tions is limited by the last sentence of Section 504(c)(2), which ad-
dresses damage remedies for infringement. This section remains
substantially unchanged by the Berne Act:
The court shall remit statutory damages in any case where an
infringer believed and had reasonable grounds for believing that
his or her use of the copyrighted work was a fair use under sec-
tion 107, if the infringer was: (i) an employee or agent of a non-
profit educational institution, library, or archives acting within
the scope of his or her employment who, or such institution li-
brary or archives itself, which infringed by reproducing the work
in copies or phonorecords; or (ii) a public broadcasting entity
which or a person who, as a regular part of the nonprofit activi-
ties of a public broadcasting entity (as defined by subsection (g)
of section 118) infringed by performing a published nondramatic
literary work or by reproducing a transmission program embody-
ing a performance of such a work.64
Fair use under Section 107 allows the use of a copyrighted
work for the purposes of "criticism, comment, news reporting,
teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship
62. Pub. L. No. 100-568, § 7(b), 102 Stat. at 2857-58. (emphasis added).
63. Pub. L. No. 100-568, § 7(a)(4), 102 Stat. at 2857.
64. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2) (1988).
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or research.""5 Thus, Section 401(d) does not remove an innocent
infringement defense from those who qualify as "fair users" under
Section 107. The provisions of Section 401(d) have also been added
to the notice provisions for phonorecords and sound recordings.6
2. Notice Requirements of U.S. Government Works
Under Section 403
Changes in the evidentiary weight of notice also affect Section
403, which addresses the notice requirements for publications incor-
porating United States government works. The Berne Act com-
pletely rewrites Section 403 to read:
Sections 401(d) and 402(d) shall not apply to a work published in
copies or phonorecords consisting predominantly of one or more
works of the United States government unless the notice of copy-
right appearing on the published copies or phonorecords to
which a defendant in a copyright infringement suit had access
includes a statement identifying, either affirmatively or nega-
tively, those portions of the copies or phonorecords embodying
any work or works protected under this title.67
Thus, under Section 403 an infringer of a work which is
predominantly made up of U.S. Government works retains the in-
nocent infringement defense notwithstanding the provisions of Sec-
tions 401(d) and 402(d). An infringer is only stripped of this
defense when the notice accompanying those works identifies those
portions of the work privately copyrighted under Title 17.
B. Copyright Registration Under Section 408
Under the 1976 Copyright Act, "no action for infringement of
the copyright in any work shall be instituted until registration of the
copyright claim has been made.' 68 The Berne Act revised the lan-
guage to create an exception to the registration requirement for
"Berne Convention works whose country of origin is not the United
States."69 Thus, the registration requirement is not eliminated.70
The Berne Act does not affect the current law regarding criminal
65. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1987).
66. Pub. L. No. 100-568, § 7(b)(4), 102 Stat. at 2858.
67. Pub. L. No. 100-568, § 7(c), 102 Stat. at 2858.
68. 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) (1988).
69. Pub. L. No. 100-568, § 9(b)(1), 102 Stat. at 2858.
70. See Strauss, Don't Be Burned by the Berne Convention, 14 NEw MATrER 1,
(Spring, 1989) (discussing this "two-tiered" registration requirement and its effects).
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enforcement of copyright.71
C. Conclusion
A practitioner should be aware of two major changes in U.S.
Copyright law: (1) notice on publicly distributed copies is no longer
required; and (2) registration prior to filing an infringement action
is no longer required.
Although the notice requirement has been dropped from the
statutory language, the presumption given for copies carrying no-
tice, and the mere softening of the language, should make a practi-
tioner wary of advising a client to ignore notice. Notice on publicly
distributed goods will not only give an author an edge in an in-
fringement action, but will also provide protection from infringe-
ment occurring in non-Berne Convention countries.
Finally, although the registration requirement language is
amended to provide an exception to foreign-nationals, it is still a
requirement for: (1) works published by U.S. national authors; (2)
works first published in the U.S.; and (3) works published by non-
Berne Convention authors (e.g., Soviet Union or People's Republic
of China).72 A practitioner should review the work carefully before
proceeding in a copyright infringement action to ascertain whether
or not registration is a prerequisite to a U.S. suit.
IV. CONCLUSION
1988 was an exciting year for intellectual property practice.
The new Trademark Law is expected to dramatically change the
nature of the trademark attorney's practice. The amended Copy-
right Law will have less dramatic consequences, at least until the
first infringement case in which there was no notice on publicly dis-
tributed copies of the infringed work. As the transfer of technology
becomes more important to the economies of each country, such
legislative action is necessary and commendable.
Elizabeth F Enayati
Stephen B. Welch
71. S. REP. No. 352, U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 3743 (there is no registra-
tion requirement for criminal copyright).
72. See Strauss, supra note 69.
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